ABSTRACT We investigate the problem of multichannel allocation for small-cell users (SUs) in 5G heterogeneous cellular networks by taking users' quality of experience (QoE) into account. In most existing channel allocation approaches, they are assumed that each user can only transmit on one channel, and the optimization goal is the network throughput without considering users' QoE demands. Moreover, the individual QoE losses of macro-cell users (MUs), which are caused by the cross-tiered interference, are not considered. In this paper, considering SUs' QoE demands and the individual QoE losses of MUs, we propose a joint matching-coalitional game theoretical scheme to solve such a QoE-based multichannel allocation problem with individual cross-tiered interference constraint in each channel. Concretely, according to the different interference and competition relationships among users, we divide the complicated problem into two subproblems, i.e., Q1: intra-cell channel allocation for SUs, and Q2: inter-cell channel allocation for smallcell base stations. We formulate the intra-cell channel allocation as a many-to-one selfish matching game and formulate the inter-cell channel allocation subproblem as an altruistical coalitional game separately. Then, the complicated problem can be solved based on the two proposed games iteratively. We propose a joint channel allocation algorithm for the matching-coalitional game theoretical scheme. We prove that the proposed algorithm converges to a stable channel allocation profile. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm achieves higher global SUs' satisfaction than the smallest interference channel selection and random allocation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The traffic load in current wireless networks has exponentially increased due to the proliferation of new wireless technologies, and will continue to increase in the foreseeable future. The next-generation (5G) wireless communication system is expected to provide high data rates and system capacity to meet the rapid growth of wireless data services and requirements, i.e., 60 Mbps and 300 Mbps in uplink and downlink, respectively, in 95 percent of locations and time [1] .
Small-cell technologies are seen as a technology component for the 5G wireless communication system to increase the wireless data by reusing spectrum resources [2] - [5] .
Small-cell base stations (SBSs) are low-power and shortrange base stations providing wireless services to small-cell users (SUs) which are different from traditional macro-cell base stations (MBSs). Because SBSs can be installed in surrounding areas, the 5G cellular wireless systems will have a multi-tier architecture consisting of macro-cells and small-cells to serve users. In underlay heterogeneous wireless networks, macro-cells share the spectrum resource with small-cells, and macro-cell users (MUs) are interfered by SBSs at the same time with the increasing of spectral efficiency.
It is well known that the quality of experience (QoE) is an essential indicator in 5G wireless communication system.
In order to ensure a high degree of QoE for each MU, the cross-tiered interference caused by SBSs in each channel must be limited. However, in order to increase the QoE of SUs, each SBS is willing to occupy spectrum resource as much as possible. The co-tiered interference among SBSs and the cross-tiered interference between MBSs and SBSs will be more serious. Thus, there is a lot of necessary to manage co-tiered and cross-tiered interference to exploit the benefits promised by SBSs [6] - [8] .
In this paper, we focus on the mitigation of co-tiered interference and study the issue of QoE-based multichannel allocation for SUs with cross-tiered interference constraint for MUs in heterogeneous wireless networks.
There are some existing works which have studied resource allocation problems in 5G heterogeneous networks with convex optimization algorithm [10] , greedy algorithm [9] , clustering based approach [11] , [12] and game based approach [13] - [15] . Among them, game based approach has been seen as one of the most important decision theoretic solutions for resource allocation in 5G communication system due to the distributed and autonomous decision process. In [18] , the authors proposed a local altruistic potential game for distributed channel selection, and used the spatial adaptive play to achieve global optimization. In [19] , the authors proposed a MAC-layer interference minimization potential game to investigate the problem of distributed channel allocation. In the proposed game, there is no information exchange among users. Users in the proposed game select only one channel to transmit information. In [13] , [16] , and [17] , the problem of resource allocation in the small-cell networks was formulated as a Stackelberg game, where the MBS acted as a leader and could put forward its own strategies and then the SBSs acted as followers and respond. In [20] , the authors proposed a coalition formation game based scheme to address the uplink resource allocation problem for multiple D2D and cellular users which combed different transmission modes, mutual interferences, and resource sharing policy in a single utility function. Literature [21] constituted a unified treatment of matching theory tailored to the peculiar properties of resource management in 5G wireless networks.
However, in most of the above mentioned works, there are three main drawbacks: i) Most mentioned works assumed that one SU (or MU) can only occupy one channel (or a resource block) at a certain time. In practice, the demands of SUs are different and each SU can transmit in multichannel simultaneously due to the progress of the hardware devices. ii) In most existing works, the optimization goals were the system throughput and did not consider SUs' QoE requirements. It is known that the QoE utility is a nonlinear function of the sum throughput of all occupied channels for each SU. Thus, the influence to users' QoE, which is caused by cross-tiered and co-tiered interference, is more difficult to detect and many of the existing methods are no longer applicable. iii) Among the above mentioned works, [18] , [19] only studied the problem of co-tiered interference mitigation in monolayer small-cell networks and did not consider cross-tiered interference in heterogeneous networks. In [13] , [16] , [17] , and [20] , cross-tiered interference was modeled into different utility functions of SUs, SBSs and MBSs without considering the individual influence to the satisfaction of each MU.
In this paper, we propose a joint matching-coalitional game theoretical scheme to allocate channels for SBSs and their associated SUs in heterogeneous wireless networks, which makes an effort to promote the global SUs' satisfaction with individual cross-tiered interference constraint to protect MUs' QoE satisfaction. It is well known that there are three kinds of influence relationships among users in the heterogeneous wireless network, i.e., the cross-tiered interference relationship between SUs and MUs, the co-tiered interference relationship among SUs associated with different SBSs (inter-cell SUs), and the competition relationship among SUs associated with same SBSs (intra-cell SUs). Based on the different interference and competition relationships, we divide the complicated channel allocation problem into two subproblems, i.e., Q1: intra-cell channel allocation for SUs, and Q2: inter-cell channel allocation for SBSs. We formulate the intra-cell channel allocation as a many-to-one matching game [25] (in which SUs selfishly compete for the channels which have been allocated to SBSs) and formulate the intercell channel allocation subproblem as a coalitional game (in which SBSs utilize the available channels cooperatively and altruistically under the cross-tiered interference constraint) separately.
The reasons for using the proposed joint matchingcoalitional game theoretical scheme model are threefold: i) The complicated channel allocation problem is divided into two tractable subproblems and can be solved based on the two proposed games iteratively. ii) The cross-tiered interference constraint can only be considered in the inter-cell channel allocation subproblem. The reason is that for MUs the crosstiered interference is caused by SBSs. The cross-tiered interference constraint is more properly handed in the coalitional game in which SBSs are the players. iii) Compared with the user terminal equipments, SBSs have strong abilities of communication and computing. In many situations, SBSs are deployed by communication operators. Thus, SBSs can solve the inter-cell channel allocation subproblem cooperatively and altruistically with the coalitional game. While, SUs with weaker communication and computing abilities are rational and naturally selfish, so they want to optimize their own QoE satisfaction. Thus, SUs selfishly compete for the channels in the proposed intra-cell channel allocation matching game. The proposed joint matching-coalitional game not only focuses on optimizing a global function at the SBS (macroeconomic) level but also considers SUs' local decisions and interactions at the SU (microeconomic) level.
The main contributions of this article are summarized as follows:
• Considering the individual interference to each MU, we formulate the QoE based multichannel allocation problem of SUs in 5G heterogeneous underlaying cellular networks as a nonlinear optimization problem with cross-tiered interference constraint. To simplify the complicated combinatorial optimization problem, we divide the problem into two subproblems, i.e., i) intracell channel allocation for SUs and ii) inter-cell channel allocation for SBSs, which have considered the different interference and competition relationships among SUs and MUs and captured the different characteristics of SUs and SBSs.
• To analyze and solve the two subproblems separately, we propose two resource allocation games, i.e., many-to-one matching game and coalitional game. Combining these two games, we propose a joint matching-coalitional game theoretical scheme to solve the complicated combinatorial optimization problem in an iterative manner.
• We propose a joint channel allocation algorithm for the matching-coalitional game theoretical scheme. We prove that the proposed algorithm converges to a stable channel allocation profile for both the proposed many-to-one matching game and coalitional game. We evaluate the influence of different network environments on our proposed matching-coalitional game based approach by comparing it with some other existing approaches. Note that the many-to-one matching algorithm for intracell channel allocation was proposed in our previous work [25] . The new differences in this work are: (1) in [25] a potential-matching game solution was applied, while in this work a matching-coalitional game solution is proposed, and (2) in [25] we only considered the model of single-tiered small-cell networks, while in this work we study the issue of SU channel allocation in two-tiered HCNs with the crosstiered interference constraint for MUs. The rest of this article is organized as follows. In section II, we present the system model and problem formulation. In Section III, the multichannel allocation problem is formulated as a joint matchingcoalitional game theoretical scheme, the existence of stable channel allocation profile is analyzed, and a multi-agent learning algorithm is proposed. In Section IV, simulation results and discussion are given. Finally, we make conclusion in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
The model of a single macro-cell with M MUs, i.e., M = {1, 2, . . . , M }, and N small-cells, i.e., N = {1, 2, . . . , N }, are considered as shown in Fig. 1 . There are L dedicated channels, i.e., L = {1, . . . , L}, for MUs to transmit information. MUs transmit information on orthogonal channels to avoid conflict. It is assumed that small-cells can transmit in same channels with MUs only when the satisfactions of all MUs are higher than determinate levels. On other words, the received cross-tiered interference of MUs in their occupied channels is smaller than some thresholds. In each small-cell, there are one or more SUs associating with the SBS. We assume that there are S SUs in the network, i.e., S = {1, 2, . . . , S}. And π n SUs are associated with each SBS n in a closed style, i.e., S n = {x n1 , x n2 , . . . , x nπ n }, x ni ∈ S, n∈N S n = S and S n ∩ S n = ø, ∀n = n . It is assumed that SBSs can transmit in same channels with inter-cell interference, but SUs associated with the same SBS can only occupy orthogonal channels to avoid intra-cell interference.
Since the allocated channel resource of MUs can be managed efficiently with the resource scheduling and power control mechanisms [22] and the macro-cell has a higher priority to allocate channels to MUs, we focus on the channel allocation problem between small-cells and SUs with crosstiered interference constraint in the scenario that MUs have been allocated determinate channels to transmit.
We 
Similarly, SUs in certain small-cell n transmit information on orthogonal channels, i.e., a s ∩a s = ø, ∀s, s ∈ S n . Here b = (b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b M ) has been determined by the MBS, while a = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a S ) is the optimized variable set to be determined. Specifically, the channel selection strategy of SUs in certain small-cell n can be denoted as a n = (a x n1 , a x n2 , . . . , a x nπn ), a n ⊂ a. It can easily find that the occupied channel set of SBS n can be
Then, the power of received signal to interference and noise ratio (SINR) of MU m in channel l can be described as
where p 0 is the transmission power of the MBS in each channel, g l 0,m is the channel gain from the MBS to MU m in channel l, F l is the SBS set who have occupied channel l, i.e., ∀n ∈ F l , there has l ∈ C n . p n is the transmission power of SBS n, g l n,m is the channel gain from SBS n to MU m in channel l, σ 2 m is the noise power.
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The achieved throughput of MU m can be described as:
where B 0 is the bandwidth of each channel. In current and future wireless systems, a key user-related metric is Quality of Experience (QoE). In the following, we use a specific unified demand-aware satisfaction utility function to describe QoE for different users with different throughput requirements. The satisfaction function of users is a universal sigmoid function, which can unify the utility function of users with different traffics [23] . And it is expressed as follow:
where r is the received throughput of each user, τ is used to adjust the slope of the utility curve around the required transmission rate r req . τ reflects the demand degree of r req . The parameters τ and r req are different for different users. This method is also applicable to other satisfaction function forms.
When small-cells share the dedicated channels with MUs,
where V m is the QoE threshold of MU m. Since u(r) is a nondecreasing function of r, there must be R m > R V m , where R V m is the throughput threshold of MU m. Thus, the received interference of MU m in its occupied channels must be restrained. In order to facilitate analysis, we assume that the received interference of MU m caused by SBSs in all its occupied channels is smaller than a same interference threshold I thed,m ,
In other words, the interference thresholds of L dedicated channels can be calculated before the channel allocation of small-cells. The interference thresholds are expressed as {I 1 , I 2 , . . . , I L }. Similarly, the SINR of SU s in channel l can be described as
where ϕ s is the associated SBS of SU s.
The aggregate throughput of SU s in small-cell ϕ s can be described as:
Then the satisfaction of SU s is u s (R s ). The global QoE utility of SUs is given by
Thus, we can formulate the optimal resource allocation problem in the small-cell network as the following optimization problem
where A is the available channel allocation space, ψ l is the MU who has occupied channel l. The above problem is obviously a NP-hard non-linear programming problem [24] . In the formulated problem, it is noted that the optimization utility function (7) has no obvious increasing and concave properties with a even with the linear constraint. Moreover, the cross-tiered interference constraint makes this problem more difficult. Therefore, it is too hard to derive the optimal solution by gradient descent algorithm or some other convex optimization algorithms. A summary of key notations is presented in Table I . 
III. A JOINT MATCHING-COALITIONAL GAME THEORETICAL SCHEME FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION
In this section, we resort to a joint matching-coalitional game theoretical scheme to solve such a complicated problem of QoE based multichannel resource allocation.
As we know, to solve (8), any direct search method would involve an exhaustive search of all possible channel allocation a for all SUs. It is apparent that such an approach incurs an extremely high complexity due to the huge action space of a.
As mentioned before, there are two kinds of interference relationships and a competition relationship, i.e., the crosstiered interference relationship between SUs and MUs which is related to the second constraint in (8) and the co-tiered interference relationships among SUs belong to different SBSs, and a competition relationship among SUs associated with same SBSs which is related to the first constraint. Due to the complex interference relationship and constraints, it is hard for the macro-cell to allocate channels to SUs directly.
On one hand, compared with the user terminal equipments, SBSs have strong abilities of communication and computing. In many situations, SBSs are deployed by communication operators. Thus, to meet the cross-tiered interference constraint and achieve a high global QoE utility, SBSs have a strong motivation to utilize the channel resource cooperatively and altruistically. On the other hand, SUs are rational and naturally selfish with limited communication and computing abilities, so they focus on the available channels in their associated SBSs and selfishly compete for the channels to optimize their own QoE satisfaction.
To simplify and resolve the complicated multichannel allocation problem, we propose a joint matching-coalitional game theoretical scheme and divide the problem into two subproblems, i.e., Q1: intra-cell channel allocation for SUs, and Q2: inter-cell channel allocation for SBSs. We apply an iterative approach which deals with intra-cell channel allocation for SUs (Q1) and inter-cell channel allocation for SBSs (Q2) separately and iteratively. The channel allocation vector can be rewritten as a = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a N ). And for the inter-cell channel allocation, the SBS channel allocation strategy can be denoted as C = (C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C N ). Since the number of channel allocation objects are much less in subproblems Q1 and Q2 than the original problem (8), the proposed solution is more tractable.
Game theory is an effective approach towards solving the above resource allocation problem involving multiple interactive objects. Thus, we formulate the intra-cell channel allocation as a many-to-one selfish matching game in which the players are SUs and channel agents, and formulate the inter-cell channel allocation subproblem as a cooperative and altruistical coalitional game in which the players are SBSs separately. The proposed joint matching-coalitional game not only focuses on optimizing a global function at the SBS level but also considers SUs' selfish decisions and local interactions at the SU level. The specific schematic of the joint matching-coalitional game theoretical scheme is shown in Fig.2 . In the following, we will analyze the two subproblems separately.
A. MANY-TO-ONE MATCHING GAME FOR INTRA-CELL CHANNEL ALLOCATION
In this subsection, we propose an intra-cell channel allocation matching game to solve subproblem Q1 [25] . Given a feasible macro-cell channel allocation C(t), we attempt to find an efficient channel assignment for SUs in each small-cell at iteration t. Specifically, for small-cell n the allocated channel set is C n (t). When SU x ni (x ni ∈ S n ) transmits in channel l ∈ C n (t), i.e., l ∈ a x ni , then the SINR of SU x ni in channel l can be expressed as
Thus, based on (6) the aggregate throughput of SU x ni at iteration t is R x ni (t) = l∈a x ni B 0 log 2 (1 + γ x ni ,l ). For each small-cell n, it tries to maximize the sum of satisfaction of all SUs in small-cell n, i.e.,
Because the macro-cell channel allocation C(t) is fixed at iteration t and small-cell channel allocation a n (t) of n does not affect other SBSs n ∈ N \n, all SBSs can optimize their channel allocation simultaneously.
There are π |C n (t)| n small-cell channel allocation strategies for small-cell n. When π n or |C n (t)| is large, the action space of a n is huge, and direct search methods can not handle this subproblem effectively. In the following, we resort a many-to-one matching game to solve subproblem Q2. VOLUME 5, 2017 The small-cell channel allocation approach using matching game involves multiple decision-making agents, i.e., the available channel resources (C n (t)) and the SUs in smallcell n (S n ). The solutions (i.e., matching between channel resources and SUs) are produced by individual actions of the agents. In the following proposed many-to-one matching game, the available channel resources (C n (t)) will be assigned to a set of SUs (S n ), where each channel will be assigned to at most one SU. In the following section, we replace C n (t) with C n for convenience, as well as other notations in small-cell n.
The actions (matching requests, confirmation or rejection) are determined by the given preference profiles. The matching outcome yields mutually beneficial assignments between the transmitters and available resources that are individually conducted by such preference lists.
Definition 1: A matching µ is defined as a function from the set C n ∪S n into the set of C n ∪S n such that (l ∈ C n , s ∈ S n ): 1) µ(l) ∈ S n and |µ(l)| = 1 for each channel, 2) µ(s) ∈ C n ∪ {ø} and |µ(s)| ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , |C n |} for each SU and 3) l ∈ µ(s) if and only if µ(l) = s.
Therefor, the tuple {C n , S n , C , S } determines the smallcell channel allocation problem with C = { l } l∈C n being the preference set of the channels, S = { s } s∈S n being the preference set of the SUs.
To fully describe the matching µ, we define the preferences by two sides of the game. From the SUs' side, each SU x ni (x ni = s ∈ S n ) can occupies multichannel and seeks to maximize its own, individual satisfaction function. Therefore, x ni only focuses on and applies for the channels which are not occupied by itself, i.e., C n \ {a x ni }. It is assumed that each SU competes for only one of the best channel for its satisfaction in C n \ {a x ni } every time until the game reaches stability. Assuming that the current channel allocation vector is a n = (a x n1 , a x n2 , . . . , a x nπn ), the satisfaction of SU x ni can be rewritten by u n i (a
Thus, the utility of SU x ni in small-cell n for a given channel l ∈ C n \ {a x ni } ∪ {ø} is given by
where u n i (a x ni + l | C −n ) is the satisfaction of x ni when adds channel l to transmit. In particular, when l = ø, there have
For SU x ni , a preference relationship x ni is defined that, for any two channels l, l ∈ C n \ {a x ni } ∪ {ø}, l = l , there has l x ni l if and only if
From the channels' side, each channel seeks to maximize its own, individual contribution to the SU satisfaction. Specifically, from the channel l's point of view, there are two kinds of SUs in small-cell n, i.e., i) the SU who have occupied channel l in the current and ii) the other else SUs in small-cell n.
Algorithm 1 Intra-Cell Channel Allocation Algorithm Using Stable Matching
Initialization: At current time t, calculate C based on channel selection profile a.
Matching algorithm:
Step 1: Each SU x ni calculates the utility x ni (l, a x ni | C −n ), l ∈ C n \ {a x ni } ∪ {ø} and updates its preference x ni . Each SU x ni sends a proposal to its most favored channel.
Step 2: Each channel l (l ∈ C n ) calculates the utility ε l (x ni | C −n ) for all the SUs who have sent proposals to channel l and the SU who has occupied channel l and updates its preference l .
Step 3: Randomly select a channel l from C n , and withdraw channel l from the SU (x ni ) who has occupied l before, i.e., a x ni = a x ni − l. Then, redistribute l to the first preferential SU (x ni * ) among the proposal SUs and x ni , i.e., a x ni * = a x ni * + l. Update the channel allocation vector a n .
Output: Return to Step 1 and repeat until ∃[l, s], s.t. l s ø and s l µ(l). Then stable matching µ.
Then, the utility of the channel l in small-cell n for a given SU x ni is given by
where where u n i (a x ni − l | C −n ) is the satisfaction of x ni when abandons channel l from a x ni .
Thus, for channel l, a preference relationship l is defined that, for any two SUs x ni , x ni ∈ S n , i = i , there has x ni l x ni if and only if
It is shown that the preference relationships of SUs and channels are strongly affected by the current formation of other SU-channel matching due to externalities of the utility functions. Due to externalities, SUs and channels may continuously change their preference orders. Thus, the traditional deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm based on preference orders without externalities are unsuitable as the ranking of the preference varies as the matching forms. We propose a small-cell channel allocation algorithm that performs a matching between the channels and SUs while taking into account the individual satisfactions.
Definition 2: A matching µ is competitive stable, if and only if no pair of {[l, s] | l ∈ C n , s ∈ S n } blocks the matching. That is, ∃[l, s], s.t. l s ø and s l µ(l).
Theorem 1: The proposed intra-cell channel allocation algorithm is guaranteed to converge to a local stable matching.
Proof: Due to the limited numbers of SUs and occupied channels, the sum of satisfaction of all SUs in small-cell n is limited. Moreover, the sum of satisfaction (10) is nondecreasing with Step 3, i.e., ε l (x ni * | C −n ) − ε l (x ni | C −n ) ≥ 0. Thus, after finite repeats, the proposed algorithm will finally converge to a global or local maximum point of U n with stable matching and no further improvement can be achieved in Step 3, i.e., x ni * = x ni .
B. COALITIONAL GAME WITH OVERLAPPING COALITIONS FOR INTER-CELL CHANNEL ALLOCATION
The coalitional game, in which the players form coalitions to improve the system performance, has recently been studied in the area of wireless communications networks. Unlike capacity limited and selfish SUs, SBSs have strong incentives to cooperation with strong abilities of communication and computing. Since each small-cell could share the L dedicated channels simultaneously, we formulate the macro-cell channel allocation problem as a coalitional game with overlapping coalitions.
In particular, depending on the SINR feedbacks, the SBSs can decide to form coalitions so as to mitigate the co-tiered interference and manage the cross-tiered interference to MUs in cooperative manners. In the proposed coalitional game, the SBSs are modeled as the players. To investigate this subproblem, we denote the coalitions as F = (F 1 , F 2 , . . . , F L ), where F l ⊂ N . In other words, all the SBSs who occupy channel l constitute the coalition F l and each SBS n can participate in multiple coalitions simultaneously. Consequently, all SBSs, who interfere with each other in channel l, are in the same coalition F l , thus the co-tier interference can be efficiently mitigated inside the coalition F l .
Given a channel allocation vector a = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a N ) and the corresponding macro-cell channel allocation strategy C = (C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C N ), then the coalitions are determined, i.e., F (a)
Formally, we define a coalitional game among the SBSs as {N , F , U}, where each SBS n can i) join in a coalition
When SBS n tries to join in a coalition F k (n ∈ F k ), each SU in small-cell n calculates the increment of QoE utility ( x ni (l, a n | C −n )) after adds channel l to transmit based on (11) . If SBS n has joined in the coalition F k , then SBS n allocates channel k to the SU with the greatest QoE increment, i.e., x ni * = arg x ni max x ni (k, a n | C −n ) and a x ni * ,k = a x ni * ∪ {k}. Then, the individual utility of SBS n to join in coalition F k (n ∈ F k (a)) is defined as follows
where a = a \ {a x ni * } ∪ {a x ni * ,k }. The defined utility function reflects the marginal contribution of SBS n joining coalition F k . It is clear that when p n g n,ψ k + j∈F k (a) p j g j,ψ k < I k , the individual utility can be rewritten as
{U j (a )−U j (a)}. Because each SBS can transmit in multichannel and there must be x ni * (k, a x ni * | C −n ) ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ N , k ∈ L \ {C n }, thus each SBS would like to join coalitions as many as possible to increase its own utility. However, due to the interference caused by each SBS's action, there has j∈F l (a) {U j (a ) − U j (a)} ≤ 0. Thus, each SBS should takes the utility loss of other members of the coalition into account when deicides whether to join the coalition.
When SBS n departs from a coalition F l (n ∈ F l ), SU x ni , who had occupied channel l, has to give up to transmit in channel l, i.e., a x ni ,−l = a x ni \{l}. Then, the individual utility of SBS n to depart from coalition F l (n ∈ F l (a)) is defined as follows
where a = a \ {a x ni } ∪ {a x ni ,−l }. The defined utility function reflects the marginal contribution of SBS n joining coalition F l . For every SBS n, we formally define the following join and departure rule: Definition 3 (Join and Departure Rule): Consider a channel allocation vector a and the corresponding macro-cell channel allocation strategy C = (C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C N ). 1) A SBS n has an incentive to join coalition
As we know that the received interference of a certain MU in channel h is limited, thus the size of each coalition is limited. When SBS n wants to join coalition F h (n ∈ F h (a)) and there has p n g n,ψ h + j∈F h (a) p j g j,ψ h > I h , SBS n can try to replace with a SBS n (n ∈ F h (a)) to achieve a higher system utility. Then, we define the following replacement rule:
, whereã is the allocation vector after SBS n departs from coalition F h , i.e.,ã = a \ {a x n i } ∪ {a x n i ,−l }. Remark 1: If a SBS n unilaterally takes an action (join in or depart from a coalition, or replace another SBS in a coalition) based on the join and departure rule and the replacement rule, the global QoE utility of SUs increases. It is clear that the global QoE utility of SUs can be also expressed as U (a) = n∈N U n . i) When each SBS n joins in a coalition F k (n ∈ F k ), the change of the global QoE utility of SUs is U (a ) − U (a) = U n (+k, a) > 0. ii) Similarly, when SBS n departs from a coalition F l (n ∈ F l ), the change of the network satisfaction utility is U (a ) − U (a) = U n (−l, a) ≥ 0. iii) When SBS n replaces another SBS n in a coalition F h (n ∈ F h , n ∈ F h ), the change of the global QoE utility of SUs is U (ã \ {a
Algorithm 2 Joint Channel Allocation Algorithm for the Matching-Coalitional Game
Step 1: The initial channel allocation profile is a[0], where
Step 2: At iteration t, the optimizing action is chosen according the probabilities P Q1 = ζ and P Q2 = 1 − ζ , 0 < ζ < 1. Specifically, randomly select a number x from [0,1], if x < ζ , then go to Step 3, otherwise, go to Step 4.
Step 3: In each small-cell n, redistribute the occupied intra-cell channels C n using the matching algorithm in Algorithm 1. Each SBS n reports the SUs' channel selection profile a n , then update the channel allocation profile a[t + 1] synthetically. Return to Step 2 and repeat.
Step 4: Randomly select a small-cell n and a channel l.
p j g j,ψ l < I l , SBS n tries to join in coalition F l based on the join and departure rule. ii) If n ∈ F l [t], SBS n tries to depart from coalition F l based on the join and departure rule. iii) If n ∈ F l [t] and p n g n,ψ l +
), SBS n tries to replace n in F l based on the replacement rule. Update the channel allocation vector a[t + 1]. Return to Step 2 and repeat.
To find the stable channel allocation profile, we propose a joint channel allocation algorithm for the matching-coalitional game. At each iteration t, we select a subproblem (Q1/Q2) to optimize according predetermined probabilities. From the two games G1 and G2, it can be noted that U can strictly increasing along such better reply actions of players. We repeat the two kinds of processes in all iterations until no further improvement is made.
Theorem 2: The proposed proposed Algorithm 2 for the joint matching-coalitional game is guaranteed to converge to a stable channel allocation profile of both the proposed many-to-one matching game and coalitional game jointly.
Proof: For intra-cell channel allocation in each smallcell n using matching algorithm in each Step 3, it is seen that the small-cell satisfaction U n is nondecreasing, and the network satisfaction utility is increasing until achieves a global stable matching. Moreover, it is seen that the updating SBS n's action in each Step 4 makes the global QoE utility U increasing from the definitions of join and departure rule and replacement Rule. Since the global QoE utility is up bounded, the learning algorithm will finally converge to a global or local maximum point of U in finite steps, i.e., a stable channel allocation profile, and no further improvement can be achieved in Step 3 and Step 4 in proposed Algorithm 2. Theorem 2 is proved.
IV. SIMULATION RESULT A. SIMULATION SCENARIO
In the following simulation study, the radius of the macrocell is 200m, the radius of small-cells is 15m. SBSs and MUs 0 /L and p n = P max n /L. The noise power density is −174dBm/Hz. To model the propagation environment, we only consider path loss for analysis simplicity for small-cell network as many of previous studies [11] . For path-loss PL = 38.46 + 20log(d ns ), where d ns is the distance between SBS n and SU s. For simplicity, it is assumed that each MU has only occupied one of all available channels, and the cross-tiered interference threshold of each MU is randomly selected from zero to half of the received MBS signal power. There are 1∼4 SUs associating with each SBS. The required transmission rates of SUs are randomly distributed in [0, 2]Mbps, and the demand degree τ of each SU is randomly select from [0, 20] . A simulation snapshot with a MBS and 15 SBS is shown in Fig. 3 .
B. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS
We analyze the expected convergence behaviors of Algorithm 2. Here, we set 1) ζ = 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 as constants and 2) ζ (t) =
t T max
where T max is a constant no less than the maximum iterations (Here we set T max = 2000). As we know, different values of ζ mean different selection probabilities of intra-cell channel allocation and inter-cell channel allocation in each iteration. The expected convergence behaviors of Algorithm 2 are shown in Fig. 4 .
It is noted from the figure that when the value of ζ decreases and ζ > 0, the convergence speed of Algorithm 2 significantly increases. The converged global QoE utility of Algorithm 2 with ζ = 0 is smaller than all others. In other words, the performance of optimizing the global QoE utility with Algorithm 2 containing intra-cell channel allocation (ζ > 0) is better than Algorithm 2 without intra-cell channel allocation (ζ = 0).
The companion results of the cumulative allocation function (CDF) of the iterations needed for converging are shown in Fig. 5 . Then, it can be concluded that the convergence performance of ζ (t) is the best. The reasons are that i) at the beginning of the iteration, intra-cell channel resource is scarce and ii) the globe utility improvement of inter-cell channel allocation is much bigger than the improvement of intracell channel allocation at most time before the convergence.
C. GLOBAL QoE UTILITY ANALYSIS
In this subsection, we present the performance evaluation results of achieved global QoE utility denoted as (7) . For comparison, the achieved global QoE utilities are calculated by three different approaches: i) optimize the global QoE utility with the proposed Algorithm 2 (ζ = 0.1), ii) a randomly selected SBS allocates one of its associated SU the best channel (the channel with the smallest received interference of the SU) in each iteration, iii) each SU is randomly allocated an available channel set at once with the constraints.
Firstly, we vary the number of SBSs in the heterogeneous wireless network, i.e., we set N = 5, 10, 15, 20 respectively and L = 8, max(π n ) = 4. The global QoE utilities when varying the number of SBSs are shown in Fig. 6 .
It is shown from Fig.6 that the utility performance of optimizing the global QoE utility with the proposed Algorithm 2 is the better than the smallest interference channel selection, and the utility performance of random selection is the worst. The reason is that, the random selection only allocates channels at once without any optimization process. In the smallest interference channel selection only one SBS can take action in each iteration, while in Algorithm 2 SBSs can collaborate with each other more fully. It is also noted from the figure that as the number of SBSs increases (the number of SUs also increase), the achieved utility of the proposed Algorithm 2 increases.
Secondly, we vary the number of channels (for simplicity, the number of MUs varies with the number of channels) in the heterogeneous wireless network, i.e., we set L = 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 respectively and N = 10, max(π n ) = 4. The global QoE utilities when varying the number of channels are shown in Fig. 7 . It is noted from Fig. 7 that as the number of channels increases, the achieved utility also increases. It is also is shown from the figure that the utility gap between Algorithm 2 and the smallest interference channel selection is smaller and smaller as the number of channels increases. The reason is that, as the channel resource increases, each SU has more available channels to be allocated, and the advantage of Thirdly, we vary the maximal SU number of each small-cell in the heterogeneous wireless network, i.e., we set max(π n ) = 3, 4, 5, 6 respectively and N = 10, L = 8. In other words, there are 1∼max(π n ) SUs associating with each SBS. The global QoE utilities when varying the number of channels are shown in Fig. 8 .
It is noted from Fig. 8 that as the maximal SU number increases, the achieved utility increases. The reason may be that the number of SUs who have low channel resource requirements also increase with the increase of the maximal SU number. Thus, SBSs with the limited channel resource can provide service to more SUs. Moreover, it can be found from the figure that the utility gap between Algorithm 2 and the smallest interference channel selection is more and more bigger as the maximal SU number increases.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the problem of QoE-based multichannel allocation in 5G HCNs with cross-tiered interference constraint. We proposed a joint matching-coalitional game theoretical scheme to solve such a complicated multichannel allocation problem. Based on the different interference and competition relationships among users, we divided the complicated problem into two subproblems, i.e., Q1: intra-cell channel allocation for SUs and Q2: inter-cell channel allocation for SBSs. We formulated the intra-cell channel allocation as a many-to-one selfish matching game in which SUs selfishly compete for the channels which have been allocated to SBSs, and formulated the inter-cell channel allocation subproblem as an altruistical coalitional game in which SBSs utilize the available channels cooperatively and altruistically under the cross-tiered interference constraint separately. Then the complicated problem could be solved based on the two proposed games iteratively. We proposed a joint channel allocation algorithm for the matching-coalitional game theoretical scheme. We proved that the proposed algorithm converges to a stable channel allocation profile of both the proposed many-to-one matching game and coalitional game. In the future, we will consider sociality-aware resource allocation problems in 5G HCNs.
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